So, the heroic defense of the new and old terminal at Donetsk airport ended after 242 days. To defend nothing more. From the terminal cost 200 million dollars was left mangled ruins. The remaining wounded defenders were taken prisoner. According to the Censor.NET, in the battle for the airport in a new terminal in the airport vicinity 16-22 January reliably confirmed the death of 23 Ukrainian soldiers, including one citizen of Georgia - their bodies were taken to morgues. 16 soldiers were captured. Not installed the fate of at least 11 soldiers - members of the battle say that they could remain under the debris of the last fortifications of the new terminal.

Search phone trying to organize volunteers. It is possible that the casualty list is not final.

What happened? "Censor.NET" made the parsing of the situation from the point of view of military tactics and known circumstances.

Infographics detailed plan of Donetsk airport name Prokofiev
1 - the Monastery; 2 - Metro Supermarket; 3 - center of Toyone/Lexus; 4 - the New terminal 5 Bus station; 6 - tank Farm; 7 - Cemetery of old aircraft; 8 - Construction VIP terminal; 9 - hangars; 10 - control tower (outside the plan); 11 - the Old terminal; 12 - Operated VIP terminal; 13 - the control Center Donbassaero; 14 - Hotel "Polyot"; 15 - office of civil aviation; 16 - Aviation repair center; 17 - Boiler;18 - air traffic control tower; 19 - Fire station
Objects that are not related to the airport's infrastructure, outlined in blue outline.

Infographics General plan Donetsk airport name Prokofiev

1 - b/h A AA; 2 - Plant and base of the company that built the new terminal 3 in/h E also defense. Signed the names of settlements and direction of the roads. All of them, except Gorlovka, controlled by the Army of Ukraine; 4 - radar; 5 - control tower; 6 - Fire part.
Tactical situation

First of all, we must understand what the positions at the airport. It is a completely open area, where you can only occupy Supervisory positions in separate buildings. These buildings are not to keep large forces, because when the concentration of the forces they become an easy target for artillery and tanks, and large losses are inevitable. Therefore, initially, the defense of the airport was a separate chain of observation posts, which caused if necessary fire support. Our forces at the airport never accounted for more than 100-120 fighters scattered points.

But most importantly, these vantage points was carried out by the adjustment of artillery fire. The artillery was possible to confidently hold the vantage points of the airport. The second important factor was the armored vehicles. A greater threat to defenders of the airport, was to attack the enemy tanks that hit the aiming point-blank. Tank mobile artillery to cover difficult. So at the airport was concentrated 2 tanks and several BMP for antitank defense.

After the enemy began to beat on our vehicles in the new terminal, the new anti-tank guided missiles, the support scheme was our command changed. In the Sand was placed Panzer division, which had always been kept in constant readiness 3-4 tank. For suppression of enemy weapon emplacements and observation posts and to reflect tank attacks our tanks were quickly moved out of the Sand.
From the outskirts of the Sand until the new terminal is about 2 miles. This is the shortest path. But we could support and base in Experienced is about 3 kilometers. The distance is short. But the problem is that as the path of the Sand and the way of Experienced well-controlled opponent. For a shot from the tank direct fire 2 kilometers - no problem.

Thus, we held positions at the airport primarily due to interaction with artillery and armored vehicles with the defenders of the airport buildings and the ability to provide immediate support for the reserves. But complicating factors was pressure from the flanks.
Autumn storms

Since September, the main loss defenders airport accounted for artillery fire on our forces support in the Sands, and on the columns that broke the new terminal.

Russian troops tried to attack the airport on the forehead, but the actions of the assault groups did not bring the enemy of success. Control tower and a new terminal dominated the area, and our spotters immediately caused the fire, and a small group repeatedly destroyed by the defenders of the terminal. To hide in open areas was not possible, the detection of the assault group in an open area meant its destruction. Attack in October ceased as were gradually carved all assault troops of the Russian mercenaries.

Played a large role in what led the defense in September-October officer 3rd regiment of the special forces Colonel So and the backbone of the defense were 30 personnel of special forces. 3rd regiment defended the airport from the beginning of may, and thoroughly knew the terrain and the airport infrastructure, which was a big advantage before the enemy.
Because our units are not increased, then we had to leave the building, which stood near the new terminal hotel, the old terminal and the new terminal was good.

Attack from Donetsk and suburbs Fun and Spartak airport more convenient than from the Sand and Experienced. Observation posts of the enemy equipped in high rise buildings, there is a possibility to reach the level of attack, using greenery among private houses. So gradually near to the Fun of a separate building our units began to leave to keep them was impossible, since it was open flanks. And the additional force of infantry in the airport transfer was impossible.

The Ukrainian leadership has adopted a more passive tactics - it was decided to withdraw from active operations and simply keep the wing of a new terminal, control tower and a number of other observation points. Despite the fact that in November were restored reserves and it became possible to strengthen our position in the airport area, no action command ATO did not take. Political factor "truces" and "termination" of fire were placed on the initiative of the Ukrainian commanders at the tactical level and constantly had a negative impact on tactics. Obviously, the command ATO inadequately assessed the situation.

As a result, in October the enemy began to change tactics. The enemy started the promotion on the flanks. Russian advanced posts were deployed in the area of the monastery in the Sand and in the village of Spartacus. Russian troops began to strengthen these positions with tanks and antitank means. At the same time in November, the enemy refused assaults, and at the airport began the war of position. The Russians occupied a separate building, and began instead attacks to try to infiltrate the building around the new terminal, and then in the new terminal, to wage war snipers and spotters, short raids and shelling from tanks.

Many Ukrainian officers and analysts pointed to the Ukrainian command on the risk of developing the situation at the airport. It was obvious that there is a threatening situation. To keep the airport was only possible if we are able to strengthen our operations in the new terminal and to protect the new terminal from the penetration of the enemy, and - most importantly, if will be taken under control flanking position and buildings, with which the enemy conducts observation and direct fire on columns made of Sand and Experienced. But no measures of the Ukrainian command has not been taken.

Autumn storms

Since September, the main loss defenders airport accounted for artillery fire on our forces support in the Sands, and on the columns that broke the new terminal.

Russian troops tried to attack the airport on the forehead, but the actions of the assault groups did not bring the enemy of success. Control tower and a new terminal dominated the area, and our spotters immediately caused the fire, and a small group repeatedly destroyed by the defenders of the terminal. To hide in open areas was not possible, the detection of the assault group in an open area meant its destruction. Attack in October ceased as were gradually carved all assault troops of the Russian mercenaries.

Played a large role in what led the defense in September-October officer 3rd regiment of the special forces Colonel So and the backbone of the defense were 30 personnel of special forces. 3rd regiment defended the airport from the beginning of may, and thoroughly knew the terrain and the airport infrastructure, which was a big advantage before the enemy.
Because our units are not increased, then we had to leave the building, which stood near the new terminal hotel, the old terminal and the new terminal was good.

Attack from Donetsk and suburbs Fun and Spartak airport more convenient than from the Sand and Experienced. Observation posts of the enemy equipped in high rise buildings, there is a possibility to reach the level of attack, using greenery among private houses. So gradually near to the Fun of a separate building our units began to leave to keep them was impossible, since it was open flanks. And the additional force of infantry in the airport transfer was impossible.

The Ukrainian leadership has adopted a more passive tactics - it was decided to withdraw from active operations and simply keep the wing of a new terminal, control tower and a number of other observation points. Despite the fact that in November were restored reserves and it became possible to strengthen our position in the airport area, no action command ATO did not take. Political factor "truces" and "termination" of fire were placed on the initiative of the Ukrainian commanders at the tactical level and constantly had a negative impact on tactics. Obviously, the command ATO inadequately assessed the situation.

As a result, in October the enemy began to change tactics. The enemy started the promotion on the flanks. Russian advanced posts were deployed in the area of the monastery in the Sand and in the village of Spartacus. Russian troops began to strengthen these positions with tanks and antitank means. At the same time in November, the enemy refused assaults, and at the airport began the war of position. The Russians occupied a separate building, and began instead attacks to try to infiltrate the building around the new terminal, and then in the new terminal, to wage war snipers and spotters, short raids and shelling from tanks.

Many Ukrainian officers and analysts pointed to the Ukrainian command on the risk of developing the situation at the airport. It was obvious that there is a threatening situation. To keep the airport was only possible if we are able to strengthen our operations in the new terminal and to protect the new terminal from the penetration of the enemy, and - most importantly, if will be taken under control flanking position and buildings, with which the enemy conducts observation and direct fire on columns made of Sand and Experienced. But no measures of the Ukrainian command has not been taken.

Intrigue, Majenko and disorganization of the battle management

Defense airport in September was carried out under the command of the commander of the operational command "South" and the sector "B" Ruslan Hamcake. However, September 15, dismissed Hamcake from direct control, and was appointed commander of sector General Dougan Deputy Hamcake. While the headquarters of Chomchai, which was created from qualified personnel officers in time of peace continued to manage the fighting in the airport area. But in December, Mourzenko decided to completely remove OK "South" from command, and in early January, all the officers who led the battles in the airport since July, were dismissed and he was assigned to do the mobilized formation of new parts. The headquarters of the sector "B" Majenko formed as a team that has no coherence, and does not have such a great experience.

But even this makeshift headquarters Majenko... was removed from command of the operations in Donetsk airport just before the attack on January 17! It seems absurd, but true.
The operation management of the Armed forces of Ukraine on defense Donetsk airport on January 16, took on himself the chief of staff Viktor Majenko. Murzenko was removed from command and control in the airport area head sector "B" General Dougan. The chief of the General staff has not issued a written order, but its solution can be easily confirmed by all the participants of the events.

Staff OK "South" ruled over all actions for the defense of the Donetsk airport from April to December 2014, and in these battles, our troops were able to repel the attacks even in difficult conditions September-October. Particularly devastating was the removal of experienced senior officers OK "South" for the management of artillery.
on 18 January, I wrote:

"Petro Poroshenko, stop showing off, grab Murzenko from the airport, do not interfere with the staff to do their job!
As the Supreme Commander gave the order to keep the airport, the operation management at the airport took upon himself... the chief of the General staff Majenko. After him, we rushed there and other ranks. What a circus... the Chief of the General staff is absolutely unnecessary in this moment at the command post man. Works headquarters sector, working staffs of the two teams - why climb to command? Well, the extra you're there, you're only interfere to control the fight, just ask unnecessary stupid questions. You live know neither people nor the environment, have you ever stopped in the Sand, well, why, why in the midst of a battle to confuse management, to interfere?
And all this in order to personally report "First"!
And Peter sees nothing strange that the chief of the General staff in charge of 220 thousand soldiers, all Armed forces, performs the tasks of the brigade commander, or interferes with the brigade commander to perform tasks. What's so can make Murzenko, which is again, no one thought the brigade commander of the 93rd, Micaz that at the airport at war for SIX months without a break?
Mr. President, it's because of the inaction of Murzenko the situation at the airport has become critical. This is the chief of the General staff instead of adequate response to the advancing Russian troops forbade troops any maneuvers. He gave the order to go on a rotation through the checkpoint "Motorola". Is it two days waiting for the next kick, to allow troops to act.
Commander-in-chief again looks like a man who needs only PR, but not the result. The duties of the chief is not part of the solution of tactical problems. But part of operational issues - preparation of mobilization, the direction reserves the steps in the other four sectors of the front. But all these uninteresting strategic issues Murzenko again someone knocked and ran to command, not by the army, and the companies and batteries.
The man who together with Nazarov and Pushnikovym must take responsibility for the Il-76, the corridor Girkin in Slavyansk, behind sector D-Ilovaysk, for 32-th checkpoint should plow and to perform their duties, and not to give up, to quit completely unreasonable mobilization and again try to interfere with the good report "First".
Petr Alekseevich, or put the fool on the spot, or stop to comment on the situation at the airport - this "Soviet" PR interferes with the army, and discredits the command to officers. Take him at least in Kiev is to stop distracting help it at least.

The January storm. The repetition of the tragedy of the 32nd checkpoint

The battle for the new terminal was lost command ATO before the storm. We kept the new terminal completely surrounded only by the heroism of the soldiers and commanders. I wrote about this on the 8th of January and warned about the threat:

"...The command ATO any actions not planned and did. Even when they were transferred to the airport 79th and 95th brigade, and effort in the area of the Sand was already enough order on extension of the corridor is not received. The enemy kept under the supervision of a stretch of road that our troops are not controlled (although the forces in that area is full), and just blatantly and brazenly violated the terms of a peace agreement, nominated for the position in our rear. This situation has been brewing. There was even obvious by analogy with the 32-m checkpoint, but no reaction command was not.

Under the guise of "truce" enemy using indecision Ukrainian command, has made a serious tactical success intercepted our communications, and in case of aggravation of the situation, the opponent got a serious tactical advantage, now our units at the airport faces a real full neighborhood.

No action was taken.

After the enemy took control of the flanks of the Russian troops entrenched in the area of Sand in the monastery, where well have viewed the road from the village to the terminal. And the road from Experienced opponent controlled from Spartacus. Units of the enemy taking advantage of the ceasefire took up positions in the new wing of the terminal and in the old terminal and entrenched. This made it possible to control the supply of reinforcements to the new terminal and allowed the enemy to avoid risk in nomination at the turn of the attack. Our artillery could not beat the enemy, who was in the same building with our units.

Unfortunately, fully repeated sophisticated tactics of the enemy to destroy our 32nd roadblock. During the "truce" the enemy has carried out the coverage from the flanks, and after the maneuver sparked fighting in a convenient area. Then the enemy concentrated fire to destroy our observation points. Of key importance was the complete destruction of the control tower of the airport. This rig was provided by the Ukrainian troops important tactical advantage is allowed to visually control all the way from the Sand to the new terminal. The destruction of the tower was now given the advantage to the Russian troops, which at the time of the armistice equipped Observatory in the monastery near the Sand, and now its bell tower has become the most high-rise facility in the area, allowing to control the enemy situation.

As soon as the operation environment of the new terminal was completed on 15 January, the enemy immediately provoked clashes and started to attack on the new terminal.

Because the enemy has occupied an advantageous position, then hold the new terminal was impossible. Already it was impossible to think - is to perform the operation or not. We had to act immediately or immediately withdraw our units from the new terminal, or to attack the enemy in the area of the monastery under the Sand and Spartacus to ensure the flanks.

Alas, steps command ATO and the General staff, especially since the 16th of January, when Murzenko for political reasons, took upon himself the management of the fight, there was nothing but a series of mistakes and misunderstandings. Having a large group of forces in the airport area, which not only matched but exceeded the opposing forces of the enemy, Majenko has not taken any serious measures to fix threatening situation.

Taking command in person at yourself and putting aside the control of the commander of the sector "B" and all the officers OK "South", the chief of the General staff simply was not able to adequately assess the situation. Murzenko not even tried to find out what the real possibilities of specific units, which he planned to throw into battle.

Despite a long truce, the General staff had not even prepared a plan for the attack on Spartacus and the monastery. The attack on 17 January was total improvisation - and poorly prepared.

For offensive operations, Mourzenko somehow not attracted prepared reserves the 1st and 13th battalions of the 95th brigade, 79 brigade, other proven parts. Shock troops for the attack on January 17, were cobbled together in a hurry, just for one day. Was attracted 2 battalion-size task force 93rd mechanized brigade, the 90th battalion 95th brigade, a small division 81st, 80th, airmobile and 17th Panzer brigades, 74 th reconnaissance battalion, 3rd regiment, special forces engineer regiment. A large part of the tasks of tactical intelligence in the region and in the area of Sand in the interests of the 93rd brigade carried out a reconnaissance of the "Right" sector - this shows the level of organization of military intelligence in the army, which depends entirely on the initiative of volunteers.

The chief of the General staff violated the requirements of the "Instructions for operations of the military authorities" because they were not issued written orders that would indicate the purpose and plan of the operation. This made it impossible to establish effective coordination troops.

But the most severe effects were that Majenko had no idea about the real fighting qualities of the troops.

It should be noted that since the staff is not engaged in serious combat training of troops and does not knocking together percussion units of permanent readiness of the fighting qualities of the various units are very different, and the same team can be units with high combat readiness and totally disabled. There are people who will perform the task at any cost, there are people who are poorly trained and can perform tasks only under favorable developments, and there are people who are not motivated and can disrupt the execution of the job. Understanding this commander in the formulation of combat tasks determines personally and composition of the unit, which assigns combat. To be sure that it's not tremble.

Given the severity of the crisis, the General staff was obliged to pull up to deblokada airport large forces and the best RAM for this purpose in Murzenko was at least two weeks!

But instead, it should be noted - the 90th battalion 95th brigade formed from volunteers, motivated people, but got to the front only in the period of calm, and serious combat experience did not get a chance. In the 93rd mechanized brigade tank battalion, which had some great tank crews, who were very familiar with the situation and had a great combat experience, was sent to Kharkov complete.

Officers told the Censor.No" how was the meeting where Murzenko set the task forces. It was very short. The chief pointed at the map, what milestones you have to go, and who should speak. He did not ask the opinions of the officers, he asked about real fighting qualities of the troops.

No attention was not paid nor the interaction between the units, nor the order of actions in case of setting of the Russian troops jamming our communications that occurred regularly at the airport - there is considerable force Russian electronic warfare.

So, on January 17, the task was one group had to take the monastery near the Sand. And then move to the hotel at the airport and cut so the enemy from the new terminal. The second group to perform a deep traversal of the district where is located the "Dorspetsstroy" and, coming to the dealership Volvo, to enter the outskirts of Donetsk, in order to cut off the movement of enemy reserves. The third is to hit the village Spartak side of the Town and exit to the Putilov junction is the main communication node and the gate in Donetsk airport for armored vehicles.

The concept of operations contained in a deep error, the plan simply does not take into account the real situation and capabilities of troops. Murzenko troops't know. He personally communicates only with those commanders who he likes, but in General, very little understanding of the real condition of the Armed forces. Therefore, the goal to advance in the area of the attack, he never asked how many real fighters for attacks can collect commanders, but really fighting machines they have got and can support the attack? As for the Ukrainian army with old appliances and a large number of hastily mobilized people are important issues. The answers to which the commander must know BEFORE the fight. And the head of Geneba had a lot of time to put together under the airport fully operational groups, in view of the threatening actions of the enemy. But nothing was done.

First of all, Mourzenko not created a serious strike groups to conduct operations on these broad goals. The attack on the monastery was applied company-tactical group based on the 6-th company of the 93rd brigade, which consisted entirely of volunteers, most of whom were former fighters "Donbass". The company increased 8 tanks and 8 BMP that has never interacted with the company and met just before the attack.

Such small forces were concentrated on other areas. Commanding 230 thousands of military personnel, the chief of the General staff in the main direction concentrated to deblokada grouping, which is not exceeded by the number of 500 men.

While these groups were again ndergone from different departments, were composed of poorly trained and poorly motivated crews and units were not provided with data exploration. The goal was quite inadequate.

Yes, there were problems with armored vehicles on the day of the attack, Yes, technical condition leaves much to be desired. But this wasn't known before the operation? Unless something prevented the staff to focus the necessary quantity of military equipment and provide overwhelming superiority in forces?

Gross error Murzenko was the fact that he is not focused on the potential for development success, retention, support, shock units.

The most egregious in the activities of the chief of staff was the fact that he once again did not take into account data exploration. At the airport worked drone volunteer movement Army SOS, but due to the fact that these volunteers criticized for incompetence General staff, data exploration drones were not taken into account and were not used during the whole period of the battle.

However, no reason for such a surface underestimating the enemy could not be. Russian troops at the airport had quite efficient units, including armored vehicles and artillery, tools, ELINT and EW. The Kremlin groups yielded the Ukrainian group in the number and quantity of military equipment, but they can easily maneuvered and had considerable firepower.

The Russian side has taken a new terminal in the shooting bag. At the same time began the attack in the terminal opponent is widely began to use sappers to undermine the walls in terminal one by one. Massive fire and demolitions destroyed installed our fighters mines and barricades. And the enemy moved forward. Given that the approaches to our wing of the airport visually controlled and prostrelivanie, and tanks of enemy direct-fire hit on our observation posts and pillboxes, and delivery of reinforcements was difficult, defenders of the terminal could not long survive. The walls have their strength - but people endured even more.

Attack on January 17, was risky. The fact that the monastery was in an open area. And for his capture would be convenient to operate at night or under cover of a smokescreen. But even given the urgency - in war anything can happen - to capture it was necessary to concentrate large forces. In the monastery the enemy is not concentrated large forces, but it was used as an adjustment item, and it was supported by tanks, mortars, and other firepower.

Ukrainian artillery trained. However, to strike at the monastery of our command was banned... for political reasons. Why we fight the enemy with impunity to adjust the fire from the monastery.

6th company of volunteers floor in the attack. The enemy had put up fierce resistance. Fighters successfully moved, despite the fire, but unfortunately, after being shelled by tanks and antitank means the enemy of our vehicles our tanks threw the infantry and withdrew from the battle. Volunteers fought 5 hours and came to the monastery. But in order to develop the success of the needed reserves. And it was necessary to adjust artillery fire on identified pillboxes, and had several tank crews, who have combat experience and know how to work with the infantry.

However, the reserves Murzenko not provided. And the connection was switched by means of the Russian EW, spare channels of communication were not available. So after consumption of ammunition 6th company had to withdraw, having lost 3 men killed and over 20 wounded. Unsuccessful was the attack on the monastery of other units.

Maneuver units 93rd brigade in the area of car sales Volvo initially could be the nature of the only demonstration activities. Sign in Donetsk with one incomplete battalion Murzenko sent personally brigade commander of the 93rd Oleg Mikasa. But such forces to capture the suburbs on the street stratosphere pilots was clearly impossible. Yes and had no meaning. Far more logical was to entrust to Micachu capture operation of the monastery and to concentrate all the available forces in order to liberate from the enemy the road from the Sand in the new terminal. Instead, Mourzenko restrictocin troops and was unable to perform any tasks.

Interesting event of the day was the attack Spartacus. A small detachment of the 17th tank and attached parts attacked the village and quickly became convinced that the enemy forces there is very slight. Our passed without resistance almost the entire Spartacus and were stopped successfully reaching the goal of the operation - Putilov interchange. In the area broke out a fight - at least one tank of the Russian mercenaries had been destroyed, at least one machine lost and our. At the junction of our unit stopped. After that, they were attacked by enemy reserves to 10-15 units of armored vehicles. The Russian crews have a good level of training, but over-zealous do not show. However, when faced with an unfamiliar situation, with no communication, and without assistance provisions for fastening on the turn, our units of Spartacus come out.

The General staff explained the failure of the weak and uncoordinated attacks strong fortified areas" of the enemy. But the analysis of hostilities this is not confirmed. Yes, there are some shelters, Yes, there are observation posts, Yes, the Russians organized a scheme to control the fire. But key role in the reflection of a weak attack with a small force in different directions played just thrown a small enemy reserves, which also did not show fortitude in battle. But the commanders of the enemy at the tactical level demonstrates great flexibility. Faced with changing circumstances and without communication, our parts stop, stop maneuver, do not conduct self-exploration. The stop time is used by the enemy, to assess the situation, conduct further exploration and to concentrate their forces to strike in a convenient location.

At this time, the initiative of the Ukrainian parts are fully constrained by the high command. If the chief of the General staff commanding the troops, to expect from him quick response is not necessary. Because war is not the company, and brigade and connections. If Murzenko managed at the operational level, and freed the initiative of the commanders tactical level, military action would have a fundamentally different character.

But the fact that the enemy did not have enough forces and means to repel a coordinated attack on the monastery and Spartak.

Our troops met no resistance, large forces of the enemy. And we could take control of Spartacus and the monastery. We were stopped just illiterate command, illiterate evaluation of the situation, the inability to respond to changing circumstances, failure to dispose of cash forces.

Attack on January 17, allowed to distract the enemy and to provide respite for the terminal, which continued fierce fighting at close range. Were evacuated wounded and dead, brought reinforcements.

But the situation has not changed. And it became clear that if will not be collected forces to repeated attacks on the same lines, the terminal will be quickly lost.

January 17, for the fate of the terminal has become a desperate and ill-advised operation rescue and attempt to deliver the convoy on 15 October at the 32nd checkpoint.

In the last days of the defense appeared thick fog. This change of weather forecasters predicted, but Murzenko did not respond to this forecast. Fog meant that or use it for action we or the enemy. Fog hampered the adjustment of artillery fire, the use of Turov, and now maneuver of mechanized units in the airport area could be carried out more discreetly. The concentration of well-coordinated and trained troops, equipped with thermal and secure communication, could cause in the event of an attack to engage in key positions around the airport. But such an operation, Majenko to develop did not. It became clear that in the case of our passivity fog will take advantage of the enemy. Because the fog had allowed the enemy to come close to the new terminal.

Match 32-m checkpoint became even more when our small detachment was sent by order of Murzenko in full fog to the new terminal, but was not provided with thermal imagery and even rudimentary navigation. Losing orientation in a dense fog, our fighters drove deep into
enemy positions. 7 soldiers were killed and 8 captured.

Starting January 17th, the new terminal was kept only because of the incredible heroism of the defenders, the enthusiasm of the volunteers, volunteers.

After blowing the enemy to the last room at the airport and drop the last wall in the early morning of January 22, the last a small group of our soldiers left the ruins of the terminal, where there are no walls that you can defend. They failed to make a 8 seriously injured and pick up dead bodies and remaining under the rubble.

For Ukraine, the defense of the airport has the same value for what France had the battle of Valmy in 1792); different countries, Different situations, different revolution. But the value of one is the evidence of the defence capability and viability of a new free nation.

And all is not in vain - not one drop of blood. The war continues. And what we have left the ruins of the new terminal does not make a difference in military strategy. The struggle continues, and for the memory of those who fought till the end in the new terminal, we will fight and we will win.

But we are obliged finally to work on the bugs. Because spring steppes of Donbass will cover "the greenery", there will be opportunities for concealed movement and maneuver, and the fighting will continue.
We need to build the army as a system, as an institution, as a mechanism. And when we build the army, there will come a time victories. I tell you this not as a journalist but as a lover of military history - that has already happened.

War is a clash of systems. We have a lot of great people brings victory at the front and in the rear, we are millions, and every day we fight for freedom more systematically and consistently.
The Ukrainian army has learned to fight - now it's time to learn how to win.

But learned to fight fighters, and we pay for it in blood and great grief. We must honor the memory of heroes and never to repeat the mistakes. We have to make more for these lessons should not have to give my life the best patriots and wonderful people...

I ask all politicians, volunteers, citizens to unite in their demands to the President, Hillary Clinton and the Parliament to establish finally the competent military command and control system, to remove perpetrators of losses generals immediately the chief of the General staff Murzenko, and others responsible for the operation of persons and immediately to conduct an investigation. The tragedy of the new terminal at Donetsk airport, 32-th checkpoint, 31 roadblock happen only because so far no one is judged and not the responsibilities of the management of the General staff and command ATO for the death of the Il-76, sector D, Ilovaysk. We must make the Supreme Commander or to restore order and responsibility in command of the ATO and the General staff. Or to resign. Mediocrity and incompetence is the main problem of the army. And you, dear Yury Biryukov , volunteers to deal only with supply issues - because we are now losing our life not because of the lack of armor, fuel and water, and due to the complete mismatch positions in the primitive bureaucrats bought myself hypocrisy and deceit shoulder straps of a Lieutenant-Colonel.

Management structure, all useless feudal-bureaucratic structure of the Ministry of defense and General staff in need of radical restructuring. Those people who are 23 years made a career and not opposed the breakup and sale of the army, not able to think and make decisions. Simple volunteers, who have never encountered the army, decide any questions a thousand times more effective than stupid and incompetent bureaucratic mafia in the Ministry of defence. We need to put forward command posts in army of those people who is not associated with the clan Murzenko, and who is able to act professionally and competently. Need commanders who do not bronzed. And who are responsible for people's lives.

UPDATE: event 15-22 January at the airport will write more, I ask you to clarify the details of the event from the participants of this operation, I will write in detail.

Yury Butusov
Card garmata.org