10 hot days in may.

13 may 1967 the Egyptian government received official notification of the government of the Soviet Union that Israeli troops are preparing to attack Syria, and that Israel's Northern border with this purpose, concentrated from 11 to 13 Israeli brigades.

Message it was done in Moscow, in a personal conversation of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR NV.In.Podgorny, head of the Egyptian parliamentary delegation in the Soviet Union, Anwar Sadat. The same message was previously communicated to the Prime Minister of Israel, Levi Eshkol, Ambassador to the USSR D. S. Cavacini, and also in personal conversation.

Levi Eshkol (right), 01.07.1963 

Eshkol replied to the Ambassador that his sources of information, most likely, not quite right. He offered him a joint mission to the North, so that the Ambassador could personally ensure that no concentration of Israeli troops there. Since the trip could be done in just a few hours, and to hide 30-40 thousand people and 3-4 thousand cars on the space width of 20 km it would be impossible to offer convincing.

However, D. S. Chuvakin no wonder he served in the Foreign Ministry of the USSR in 1938 - almost 30 years. Quite calmly he replied that his business is not to check the messages his government, and to bring them to the attention of the Israeli Prime Minister then interrupted the conversation and leave.

The conversation was unpleasant. On the Syrian border during the first months of 1967 there were incidents - one after the other "Fedayeen" coming from Syria, staged attacks on the roads, put mines. The victims were. The shelling of border kibbutzim from the Golan heights were on such a regular basis that it had to enter the aircraft. On 7 April, the Syrians also used their MiGs, but failed. In the air battle over the Golan they have lost 6 MiG-21, no casualties on the Israeli side.

So tension existed, in that the Ambassador was right.

So Eshkol invited the chief of the General Staff of Israel - to them at that time was Yitzhak Rabin is to reduce the military parade was to take place in Jerusalem on Independence Day, 15 may, to an absolute minimum.

On 14 may Egyptian forces began advancing on the Sinai, towards the Israeli-Egyptian border. A column of military equipment - two in the afternoon and the parade walked through the streets of Cairo, directly under the Windows of the American Embassy.

On the same day the chief of the General Staff of the Egyptian army, General Mahmoud Fawzi, flew to Damascus to establish proper coordination between the armies of Egypt and Syria.

Big trouble in Israel is caused. The chief of military intelligence of Israel, General Yariv, informed the Prime Minister that we are talking about demonstrations - like the one the Egyptian army has already conducted in 1960, and also in support of Syria. The likelihood of war, he was considered as low according to the forecast of intelligence, the peak of readiness of the Egyptian army had come at the end of 1970, after the completion of the program of military supplies from the USSR.

Besides, it was difficult to imagine that Egypt will start something serious to reach an acceptable settlement in Yemen. There was a war, in which Egypt was involved in the most tactile way, and not only politically. 8 Egyptian brigades were in Yemen fighting, Egyptian aircraft bombed Yemeni royalist, even using chemical weapons.

May 15 was held in Israel very modest military parade, which is against tradition - was not involved no tanks, no field artillery, just passed a parade soldiers – a total of 1,600 people. The situation in the country did not have for the festive celebrations. The lack of military equipment on parade, however, was a very noted Arab media - although interpreted this observation was not as hoped Eshkol. Arab Newspapers came to a unanimous opinion - all that can shoot, is already on the Syrian border.

Already during the ceremony the parade of Eshkol received a note from the defense Ministry - the number of Egyptian troops in Sinai has increased from 30 thousand to 60, and continued to grow. After the meeting in the Ministry of defence decided to start a partial mobilization.

On the morning of may 16 the Indian General commanding the UN troops in the Sinai, has received notification from General Fawzi with a request to remove part of it with the Egyptian-Israeli Garnica to "not interfere with the actions of the Egyptian army in case Israel would undertake aggression against any Arab country." This request was immediately brought to the attention of the UN Secretary-General, the Burmese diplomat, U Thant, quite pedantically replied that the request of one General to another cannot be the basis for any action by the UN - but added that if it receives the request in proper form, it will execute.

His desire was immediately fulfilled - the foreign Minister of Egypt, Mahmoud Riad, in his kind letter to the Secretary-General informed him that the government of Egypt adopted a decision "about the termination of activity of the UN troops on the territory of Egypt and in the Gaza strip".

Next happened something that had not to this day has no parallel in the history of international organizations. Without any consultation with anyone U Thant agreed to comply with the request of the government of Egypt. This is a highly dramatic decision is unprecedented, a truly cosmic speed - the answer was delivered to the Egyptian government through 75 minutes after receiving the request.

Abba Eban, Minister of foreign Affairs of Israel in that period, in his memoirs expresses utter amazement that the UN is known for its bureaucracy and slowness were capable of such rapid action. One gets, however, the impression that he wondered vain - this impromptu looked very well prepared.

In fact, try to imagine that important - even crucial - document must be read, must be understood, the answer should be formulated, it should finally be printed (immediately, without a draft?), and must be delivered - and all this for 75 minutes?

Ban somehow complains that neither with Israel nor with States that have supplied troops to the UN troops in the Sinai, not consulted.

With some countries meeting undoubtedly took place. India, for example - as well as Yugoslavia - not only immediately expressed its full consent to the withdrawal of their parts, but even started to implement this conclusion, without any delay, without even getting no - at least official statements from the UN Secretariat. So what with Israel never consulted is understandable.

Here's what is absolutely unclear is what U Thant did not collect the Security Council did not notify without delay the General Assembly, did not talk with any of the ambassadors of the countries that have a permanent representation in the Security Council - and, by the way, there have veto power.

What's even more interesting - none of these powers have not wished to take the initiative of convening a session of the Security Council that they had an inherent right. The Secretary-General was criticized U.S. and Canada - and in private. Subsequently, it explains the fact that Western countries were sympathetic to Israel, but believed that in the General Assembly of the Asian and African countries automatically will support Egypt as a prominent member of the non-Aligned Movement. Confrontation should be avoided.

While the Security Council was blocked by the Soviet Union, which has already expressed the view that "there is no crisis, and the aggravation of the situation to blame the Israeli provocations."

Ban with great pride, that leads the words of the speech afterwards in which he cleverly compared the actions of the UN troops c "fire brigade, withdrawn at the very moment when there appeared the first traces of smoke." Perhaps, he ought rather to complain than to "firefighters" and the "Council of municipality" - but of course, it would be downright undiplomatic.

2 may 17, Egyptian MiG flew over the territory of Israel - from the East (from Jordan) to the West. Their flight was right over the Israeli nuclear center in Dimona. To intercept them did not.

U Thant expressed his desire to visit Cairo, in order to "see the situation on the ground". Why he decided to go there since its so famous, and an equally sudden decision - and not before, for example - is also left neobyatnoy.

May 18, Egyptian diplomats advised him - apparently in gratitude - to postpone his visit until then, until it receives an official invitation.

On may 19, the Soviet Ambassador in Israel visited the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban at his request. He has explained to the Minister that it is not in the movement of Egyptian troops in the Sinai, "Israeli politics, continuously and without any need obostrana the already difficult atmosphere" and made the bold assumption that "the mines on Israeli roads, adjacent to the Israeli-Syrian border, really put the CIA agents". Eban writes in his memoirs that the Soviet Embassy was notified by the Moscow that the Eshkol government is unstable, does not have proper authority to wage war, and in General can fall at any moment.

The price of this knowledge was not too great - may 21, exactly the same information appeared in the Israeli newspaper "Yediot of Ahronot", with the clarifications that remaining on the sidelines (after unsuccessful elections of 1966) prominent Labour Party Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan already negotiating the creation of a new government with opposition leader Menachem begin. Eshkol, as Prime Minister in this case would have to change Ben Gurion international airport.

Occurs, however, the question - "Yediot akhronot" Eban could read without the help of the Soviet Ambassador, but that's how he knew about the content of Soviet telegrams? Either Israeli intelligence was reading Soviet diplomatic correspondence, and even did not consider it necessary to hide it, or - more likely - the Ambassador Chuvakin told the Minister something that the Protocol of their conversation were recorded. For example, he could advise the Israeli government to exert more concessions - because of the unreliability of the provisions of the government itself...

On the evening of 21 may, the Prime Minister of Eshkol made a speech addressed to the nation. This speech was uttered after the meeting at the defense Ministry, which has adopted the opinion that war is most likely inevitable. However, Eshkol believed that everything possible should be done to avoid it. He was not alone in this opinion - Ben Gurion believed that the situation is very dangerous, that there's no aid is not visible, and that the blame of Eshcol. The old man (Ben Gurion was now 81 years old) was very unhappy with his successor. A huge responsibility lying on the shoulders of Eshkol, was aggravated by the fact that mistrust of his actions had not only his grouchy predecessor.

Sensible agronomist, a very good administrator, well proved on a post of the Minister of Finance, Eshkol in my ' 72 had no military experience, no oratorical gift, he has no charisma of a born leader. He said in the Knesset restrained, even conciliatory speech. All the forces he tried to soften him up. Aqaba Strait and access to Eilat were not even mentioned - Eshkol wanted to show that the idea of the action of Egypt, aimed at the resumption of the blockade, so "unthinkable" that does not even come into his head.

On 22 may, at the time when U Thant, to finally get the invitation to visit Nasser, had to land in its capital city, Radio Cairo it proclaimed the closure of Aqaba Strait - "all vessels heading to the Israeli port of Eilat". The announcement of the blockade of the seaport of any country, according to the laws and precedents of international law, was an act of war.

Source: http://www.waronline.org/

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